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1. 
Recently, free will has been declared dead, but, of course, not for the first time. 
Something seems to be new, however. What is new is that this time the verdict 
comes from neuroscience. And the neuroscientists seem to feel certain that they 
have finished their cause. But is this feeling justified? Are the arguments put 
forward really sound? Let’s have a look at the evidence. 
The most prominent neuroscientific arguments are based on experimental 
findings known as the “The Libet experiments”. The aim of these experiments 
was to investigate the relationship between the subjectively felt decision to act 
and the neuronal processes leading to the corresponding movements. Research-
ers carrying out Libet’s procedure asked each participant to sit at a desk in front 
of an oscilloscope timer, attached EEG electrodes to the subject’s scalp and in-
structed her to carry out some simple motor activity such as pressing a button, or 
flexing a finger or wrist, within a certain time frame. The subject was asked to 
remember the position of the dot on the oscilloscope timer when “he/she was 
first aware of the wish or urge to act” (Libet et al. 1983, 627). Pressing the but-
ton electronically recorded the position of the dot on the oscillator. By 
comparing the time of pressing the button and the subject’s conscious decision 
to act, researchers were able to calculate the total time of the trial from the 
subject’s initial volition through to the resultant action. On average, 
approximately 200 milliseconds elapsed between the first appearance of 
conscious will to press the button and the act of pressing it.  
The most surprising outcome however resulted from analyzing the EEG 
recordings for each trial with respect to the timing of the action. It was noted 
that brain activity involved in the initiation of the action, primarily in the 
secondary motor cortex, on average occurred approximately 550 milliseconds 
before the trial ended with the pressing of the button. That is to say, researchers 
recorded mounting brain activity responsible for the resultant action as many as 
350 milliseconds before subjects reported the first awareness of conscious will 
to act. Conscious decisions to act were preceded by an unconscious buildup of 
electrical charge within the brain, where this buildup came to be called 
‘Bereitschaftspotential’ or ‘readiness potential’. 
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Of course, these findings are surprising. Yet, what exactly do they entail? Do 
they really show that we are never free in what we will and what we do? 
Gerhard Roth, to name just one, says “Yes, they do.” Freedom, Roth argues, 
presupposes that our actions are caused by us, i.e., by an immaterial act of our 
will (Roth 436). But, he goes on, Libet’s results show conclusively that this is 
not the case. If a readiness potential can be recorded already 350 ms before the 
conscious act of will occurs, the decision to, say, press the button must have 
been made earlier, and since the act of will occurs 350 ms later, it cannot be 
identical to the decision in question. It cannot be our will that made the decision, 
it must have been the brain itself that made the choice. According to Roth, there 
is clear alternative – either it is our will that is responsible for our actions or our 
brain. And if it is the brain, the conscious act of will can at best be an epiphe-
nomenon. Freedom presupposes that our actions are determined by our will, but 
Libet’s results show that our actions are determined neither by us nor by our 
will, but by our brain – thus, they show that we are never free in what we do. 
Undoubtedly, a Cartesian picture of the mind is lurking in the background of 
Roth’s account of freedom. According to this picture, a self is an immaterial be-
ing, something that is not part of the natural order of the physical world. Free-
dom, therefore, is only possible if immaterial selves are able to intervene in the 
normal context of nature from outside. 
Wolf Singer has put this idea in the following way:  
“In our experience we are given to ourselves as free mental beings. But the scientific 
way of looking at things leaves no space for a mental agent of the kind of a free will 
which, if it is to result in deeds, would in some inexplicable fashion need to interact 
with our nerve cells.” (Singer/Wingert 2000 – italics mine) 
If Roth and Singer were right, if freedom presupposed that there are 
immaterial selves with the capacity to intervene into the natural order of the 
world from the outside, I would concede that the findings of neuroscience are 
conclusive evidence against the existence of free will. But Roth and Singer’s 
premisses are more than doubtful. Cartesianism faces such an enormous amount 
of objections that we can reasonably assume that it is false. We should not think 
of selves as immaterial beings existing outside the natural world. Rather, we 
should acknowledge that, as living beings, persons are integral parts of this 
world. Persons, to put it bluntly, are animals – though animals endowed with 
cognitive capacities that, as far as we know, no other animals possess. 
2. 
However, if persons – if we – do not stand outside but rather are integral parts of 
the natural world, we immediately face the following questions: What could it 
mean in this case that sometimes at least we are the authors of our actions? And 
what could it mean in this case that sometimes at least we are free in what we 
decide and what we do? Let us start with the first question. 
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If naturalism is correct, i.e., if persons are integral parts of the natural world, 
their actions, decisions and considerations are natural events or processes that 
have natural causes, if they have any causes at all. However, naturalists do not 
deny that some actions are my actions, some decisions my decisions and some 
considerations my considerations. Yet, how can, say, a decision be my decision, 
if it is nothing but a natural process? How can I be the “author” of a decision, if 
it is not caused by me, but by other natural events? Part of the answer is that the 
term “author” is very misleading here if it is understood in the sense of agent 
causation. Does a cat chase a mouse, i.e., is it the cat which is doing the chasing, 
only if the cat is the cause of the chasing behaviour? Does a monkey reflect on 
how to get a banana only if the monkey is the author of this reflection in the 
sense that it brings it about in a causal way? No. Rather, one should say that 
matters are roughly as follows.  
In the case of animals – and even in the case of certain robots – it is possible 
to distinguish between what an animal does and what happens to it. This is how 
we distinguish cases where a dog chases a rabbit from cases where it is forced 
away from its favourite tree by someone’s pulling the leash. The classification 
of movements as actions depends upon two features. First, the beings in question 
must have their own resources of energy and, second, they must be autonomous 
in the sense that their movements are determined by internal control mecha-
nisms which are such that they (a) do not (like simple reflexes) always respond 
in the same way to the same kind of stimulus and (b) are not remote-controlled. 
In general, if the actions of animals are not simple reflex actions, this amounts to 
two things: (a) they can act in more than one way, and (b) the choice of the ac-
tion which is actually performed is a matter of the animal’s internal control 
mechanism. Because, and to the extent that, animals’ actions are not mere reflex 
actions, a decision has to be made prior to every action. After all, there must be 
some way of determining which among the possible actions will be performed in 
the circumstances given. ‘Making a decision’ in this case means only that this or 
that action is initiated. If such a decision rests on the relevant internal control 
mechanisms, one may say that the animal itself has made the decision. If, how-
ever, someone intervenes from the outside and brings about a decision by way 
of, say, radio signals or other kinds of manipulative means, then this is an exter-
nally induced decision that was not made by the creature itself.  
We thus arrive at a picture of reality according to which it is quite possible to 
say of beings that belong to the natural order that they themselves have per-
formed a given action or taken a certain decision. According to this view the al-
ternative ‘either me or my brain’ doesn’t exist, because a decision may be my 
decision, even if it is caused by neural processes. The decisive question is only 
whether these processes constitute an internal control mechanism of the right 
kind. 
– 4 – 
3. 
Suppose a decision can be my decision although it is 
caused by a neural process. Then we still face the sec-
ond question: Can this decision also be free if it is 
caused in this way? At first glance, this seems to be 
impossible. However, I think that the answer to this 
second question can also be “Yes.” To explain why, I 
have to go back a bit. 
Philosophers are used to distinguish between free-
dom of action and freedom of will. We are free to act 
if we are able to do what we want to do. David Hume 
held the view that freedom, real freedom, amounts to 
nothing more than freedom of action: “By liberty, 
then, we can only mean a power of acting or not act-
ing, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at 
rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty 
is universally allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prisoner and in 
chains.” (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sec. 8, part 1, 159)  
However, already Thomas Reid insisted that freedom 
to act is not enough. We must not only be able to do 
what we want to do, we also must have the ability to 
determine our own will, if we are to be really free. That 
Reid was right can be shown by the case of a drug ad-
dict. There is a sense in which a drug addict can do what 
he wants to do. He is free in his actions in the sense that 
(we shall suppose) he is able to take drugs whenever he 
wants to take drugs. The drug addict is not subject to 
any kind of external force. Internally, however, he is 
controlled by a form of compulsion, and therefore he is 
not free in his decisions – his will leads a life of its own, 
as it were. Even if he wanted to decide differently, his 
desire to take drugs would prevail. A drug addict is, so 
to speak, at the mercy of this type of desire. What he lacks is free will.  
As we have seen, freedom of action is the ability to do what one wants to do 
and freedom of will the ability to determine one’s own will. But what does it 
mean to say that someone has the ability to determine his own will? From a 
naturalist point of view, it cannot mean that the subject as an immaterial self can 
cause her will to be this way or that way. But if this is not what is meant, what is 
meant? 
I think it may be helpful to recall what John Locke said in chapter 21 (“Of 
Power”) of the second book of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. 
Locke’s first answer to the question what determines a man’s will is that the will 
is naturally determined by “the most pressing uneasiness” (§ 40). This, however, 
David Hume 
1711-1776 
Thomas Reid 
1710-1796 
– 5 – 
is not the full story. For, as Locke says, human beings are not simply driven by 
what they feel to be the most pressing uneasiness; in most cases they have the 
capacity to pause before acting and to reflect on what they ought to do in this 
situation, what would, from a moral point of view, be the right thing to do or 
what would best promote their well-considered self-interest. 
“There being in us a great many uneasinesses always 
solliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natu-
ral, as I have said, that the greatest, and most pressing 
should determine the will to the next action; and so it 
does for the most part, but not always. For the mind 
having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a 
power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any 
of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty 
to consider the objects of them; examine them on all 
sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the lib-
erty Man has; […] we have a power to suspend the 
prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily 
may Experiment in himself. This seems to me the 
source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, 
which is (as I think improperly) call’d Free will. For during this suspension of any de-
sire […] we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil of what 
we are going to do; […] and ’tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, 
and act according to the last result of a fair Examination.” (§ 47) 
According to Locke, then, free will rests on being capable to pause before act-
ing and to consider what ought to be done in the situation at issue and what rea-
sons favour one alternative rather than another. Our will is free if we have two 
decisive capacities – first the capacity to pause before making a decision and to 
deliberate about what would be the right thing to do in the situation given, and 
second the capacity to decide and to act in accordance with the result of this de-
liberation. 
It is one of the great advantages of this view that it squares nicely with the 
case of the drug addict. What the addict complains about is that, even though he 
knows that his addiction will ruin his health, he cannot help taking drugs. What 
he lacks is the ability to choose what, according to his own judgment, appears 
the right thing to choose. He may have the ability to reflect and to understand 
that what he does will harm himself and may possibly be immoral. But that re-
mains without influence on his decisions. These decisions are determined by 
circumstances that cannot be influenced by considerations of this type. What the 
drug addict lacks is the ability to decide in accordance with the results of his de-
liberations. 
4. 
Let us assume that Locke is right, that free will rests on the capacity to pause 
before making a decision and to deliberate about what would be the right thing 
to do, and on the capacity to decide in accordance with the result of this delib-
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eration. Does the naturalist gain any advantage from embracing this view? Does 
it not immediately lead to the conclusion that we are never free in our decisions 
if all these decisions rest on neural processes? How can we possess Locke’s de-
cisive capacities, if our will is determined by what goes on in our brains? 
I don’t think the situation is that desperate. But before we see why, let us first 
make one thing quite clear: As Locke already pointed out, there can be no rea-
sonable doubt that sometimes at least we can be affected by considerations and 
arguments. Suppose I am lying in bed and the alarm clock starts ringing. I really 
ought to get up, for in an hour from now the faculty board will meet. On the 
other hand, it’s been late last night and it would be nice to remain in bed. When 
I am just about to decide to stay in bed, a colleague of mine calls. “You have to 
attend to the faculty meeting. An important election will take place and your 
vote may be decisive.” There is no doubt that the phone call, i.e., the argument 
put forward by my colleague, can influence my decision. Otherwise there would 
be no reason for her to give me a call at all. Thus, there is only the following 
alternative – either not all decisions rest entirely on neural processes or there are 
at least some neural processes that are sensitive to arguments. 
I am convinced that the latter is true. But how can it be true? How can neural 
processes be influenced by arguments? The answer lies in a well-known fact, the 
consequences of which, however, are scarcely noticed: the fact that many physi-
cal processes admit of multiple descriptions. Take e.g. computers. At first, the 
aim of these electronic devices was to compute the results of certain mathemati-
cal functions – the sum, product, or quotient of two integers, the square of a real 
number, etc. But how could they accomplish this task given that they are just 
electronic devices, i.e., nets of transistors which, given a certain electronic input, 
produce other electronic impulses as outputs. Turing’s great ideas rest on the 
observation that when we compute the sum of two integers by using pencil and 
paper our computing is a physical process – physical marks appear on the paper 
in certain order until finally the mark of the sum is produced. To construct a 
computer is just to build an electronic device which produces corresponding 
electronic marks in 
the same, or an 
equivalent, order. 
Starting from elec-
tronic states stand-
ing for the two 
terms of a sum, 
new states are pro-
duced in an algo-
rithmic way until 
finally an electronic state is reached that stands for the sum itself. This does not 
sound very spectacular. But the implications are important. In a sense, in a com-
puter we find nothing but electronic processes. Yet, some of these processes are 
(at the same time) processes of computing the sum of two integers, and com-
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puters show that there is nothing miraculous about this. There doesn’t have to be 
a little homunculus inside doing the computing. The physical device itself suf-
fices to do the job. 
The same, or something very similar, 
is true with regard to brains. On the one 
hand, brains are huge aggregates of mul-
tiple connected neurons that fire at a 
certain rate and by so firing affect the 
firing rates of other neurons. On the 
other hand, the firing of certain neural 
nets is (at the same time) the perception 
of a certain face, the recall of a situation 
in the past, or the decision to raise the 
arm. That, at least, is what cognitive 
neurobiologists tell us. But if this is cor-
rect, it is only a small step to the further 
assumption that even our deliberations and weighings of reasons have a neural 
basis. In other words: That a certain process is a neural process in no way pre-
cludes that the very same process is a process of deliberating about what would 
be the best thing to do. Of course, this implies that neural processes can be af-
fected by reasons and arguments. Is this conceivable? 
Already Hubel and Wiesel found so called “edge detectors” in our brains, 
cells in the cortex that do not simply respond to the presence of light, but rather 
to the presence of edges in their region of the visual field. Furthermore, cells 
were found that fire only in the presence of a vertical edge at a particular loca-
tion in the visual field, while other nearby cells respond to edges of other orien-
tations in the same region of the visual field, and such orientation-sensitive cells 
were found all over the visual cortex. 
More recent research has proved that there are more complex cells that are 
sensitive to particular faces or to certain kinds of food or to other features of the 
environment. Moreover, we have any reason to believe that there are also mean-
ing-sensitive neurons in the brain, for not only we, but also our brains react quite 
differently in response to an utterance of the words “fire” and “free beer,” re-
spectively. And this is not only because “fire” and “free beer” differ syntacti-
cally. For not only we, but also our brains react quite similarly to the utterance 
of “fire” and “there is something burning”. That is, our brains react differently if 
the words uttered differ in meaning and similarly if these words have a similar 
meaning. 
In the same vein, we have any reason to believe that there are neural proc-
esses that are sensitive to reasons and arguments. If my colleague gives me a 
call and says: “You have to attend to the faculty meeting. An important election 
will take place and your vote may be decisive,” then that may affect my behav-
iour. But this, it seems to me, is only possible if her argument can have an affect 
on the neural processes in my brain that lead to this behaviour. 
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It is time to sum up. We started from the assumption that persons are not 
immaterial beings existing outside the natural world, but rather, as living organ-
isms, integral parts of this world. This assumption, however, lead to the question 
of what could it mean in this case that sometimes at least we are free in what we 
decide and do? The first part of the answer we found in Locke’s considerations 
on free will. Persons are free in their decisions if, first, they are able to pause 
before making the decision and to deliberate about what would be the right 
thing to do, and if, second, they have the capacity to decide in accordance with 
the result of this deliberation. But this view immediately lead to a second ques-
tion. How can persons, as living beings, possess Locke’s capacities if all their 
decisions and all their actions have a neural basis?  
As a naturalist I have a straightforward answer to this question. Some neural 
processes are at the same time processes of deliberating and decision making as 
is proved by the fact that these processes are sensitive to reasons and arguments. 
All capacities human beings are endowed with have a physical basis – the 
capacity to breath as well as the capacity to speak, the capacity to reproduce as 
well as the capacity to think. All the evidence available supports the view that 
all our cognitive capacities are based on the structure and functioning of our 
brains – the capacity to see as well as the capacity to remember, the capacity to 
speak as well as the capacity to deliberate. This, however, does not preclude that 
sometimes at least our decisions and actions are free. On the contrary, we are 
free insofar as we possess these capacities. The fact that they all have a neural 
basis is not at all at variance with our having a free will.   
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